RETRIBUTIVISM REFINEDOR RUN AMOK?
Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 10-11
(May 7, 2010)
Forthcoming, The University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 77 (2010)

Kenneth W. Simons

A Review of
Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law
Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, with Stephen Morse.
Cambridge, 2009. Pp xiii, 330.

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2010.html

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1601910
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601910

File: Simons Review AlexFerzSSRN

Created on: 5/7/2010 8:05:00 AM

Last Printed: 5/7/2010 8:05:00 AM

REVIEW

Retributivism Refined—or Run Amok?
Kenneth W. Simons†
Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law
Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, with Stephen Morse.
Cambridge, 2009. Pp xiii, 330.
INTRODUCTION
What would the criminal law look like if we took retributivist prin‐
ciples very seriously? In this engagingly written, lively, philosophically
astute book, the authors—Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,
with contributions by Stephen J. Morse—provide a controversial set of
answers. Whether a criminal act does or does not result in harm should not
affect the actor’s punishment (p 171). Only the last act of risk creation
should suffice for liability (p 197). Conscious awareness of risk should al‐
ways be necessary (pp 70–71). And all of criminal law, every category of
mens rea and actus reus, should be reduced to the following single idea: Do
not be reckless; do not knowingly take risks that are clearly unjustifiable in
light of your reasons for taking those risks (p 263).
Few scholars and even fewer legislators will be persuaded, but that
is of no moment. The authors have developed a set of arguments of re‐
markable breadth, depth, and originality. The arguments are fleshed out
with terrific, vivid illustrations. The analysis is subtle and penetrating
but leavened with playful humor. The authors are also brutally honest
about the extreme implications of their positions. Indeed, they seem to
relish these contrarian and radical repercussions, as we will see. I have
no doubt that the book will be grist for the mill of criminal law theorists
for many years to come.
In Part I of this Review, I briefly summarize the authors’ most con‐
troversial claims, and also flag a few of their many intriguing secondary
assertions. In Part II, I step back to examine the wider picture and ask
whether, and to what extent, the authors are consequentialists in retri‐
butivist clothing. Part III turns to the authors’ analysis of recklessness,
and investigates two critical questions: Can recklessness really suffice as
the sole criterion of culpability? (The answer, alas, is no.) And, is their
† Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Bos‐
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requirement of “conscious awareness” of risk too demanding? (Indeed
it is.) In Part IV, I address a surprising phenomenon, the reappearance
of the reasonable person as a central requirement of their culpability
criterion, notwithstanding their unequivocal rejection of the reasonable
person as part of a criterion of liability for culpable inadvertence to risk;
I then critique that reincarnation.
I. FOUR CONTROVERSIAL POSITIONS
The four most controversial positions that the authors endorse are
the following:
1. Results should not matter. Whether a harmful outcome of the de‐
fendant’s act occurs does not matter morally and should not matter
legally. If D1 intends to kill, but the bullet misses his target, he
should be punished to the same extent as if he succeeded in killing
(p 172). And if D2 drives much too fast around a dangerous blind
curve but just misses colliding with the car in the opposite lane, he
should be punished to the same extent as if he actually killed all the
occupants of the car. (Indeed, he should be punished the same even if
there was no car in the opposite lane (p 30).)
2. Only the “last act”1 of risk creation should suffice for criminal liabil
ity. Any earlier act—that is, any act over which the agent still re‐
tains control—is insufficient.2 Thus, if D3 has not yet pulled the
trigger of a gun he is pointing at the victim, he should not be pu‐
nished as harshly as one who has done so (even if his intention to
kill the victim is absolutely clear from other evidence) (pp 217–18).
Indeed, on their view, so long as D3 retains control over the risk, he
should not suffer any criminal penalty, regardless of the firmness of
his illicit intention or his close proximity to causing the harm. Sup‐
pose D3, having carefully planned the killing of V, carries a con‐
cealed loaded gun, which he believes poses no risk to others until
he pulls the trigger, and then approaches V from behind, points the
gun, and is just about to pull the trigger when he hears a police si‐
ren and runs away. He should not be guilty of a crime, they assert
1
This is the standard term employed in the literature on criminal attempts. See Joshua
Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 27.06[B][2] (Lexis 5th ed 2009) (defining the “last act”
test). It refers to an act by which the defendant believes that he has done all that he must in order to
produce the intended result (such as the death of a victim or the burning of a building). I put the
term in quotes because the authors are also including risky acts that are not intended to produce
harm, such as dangerous driving (pp 198–216).
2
If D retains complete control of the risk—that is, if he believes that there is no chance that
the risk will cause harm to a legally protected interest—then, on their view, criminal culpability is
unwarranted (p 19). The authors also emphasize that the defendant must be able to control the risk
of harm he has created “through exercise of reason and will alone” (p 197).
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(p 212). Similarly, on their view, a dangerous driver should not suf‐
fer any criminal penalty so long as he has not genuinely “un‐
leashed” the risk of harm (p 220). So if D4 drives at a high speed
around a blind curve but confidently believes that he will be able to
stop in time to prevent injury, he should not, the authors assert, be
punished.
3. Recklessness should be necessary for criminal liability. Negligent in‐
advertence to a risk, no matter how unreasonable or outrageous,
should be insufficient (p 70). I say more in Part III.A about the dis‐
tinctive definition that they offer for recklessness. In essence, a
person acts recklessly if the risks that he subjectively believes that
his act poses are clearly unjustifiable in light of his reasons for tak‐
ing those risks (p 27).
4. Recklessness should be the only requirement for criminal culpability.3 It
should replace all categories of mens rea and actus reus. “[T]here is
really only one injunction that is relevant to criminal culpability:
choose only those acts for which the risks to others’ interests—as
you estimate those risks—are sufficiently low to be outweighed by
the interests . . . that you are attempting to advance (discounted by
the probability of advancing those interests)” (p 263). The special
part of the criminal law, identifying all of the particular criminal of‐
fenses, should be eliminated (p 263).4
An unfriendly critic might declare that these various positions heap
absurdity on absurdity. The first position asserts that criminal liability
should exist even if the risky act caused no harm, and indeed had no
objective possibility of causing harm. Moreover, the first and fourth po‐
sitions combined would extend criminal liability to any act of unjustifia‐
ble risk creation, no matter how miniscule the risk. If Franklin takes a
leisurely stroll through a crowd rather than staying home, and the sole
purpose of his stroll is his sadistic desire that someone in the crowd will
collide with him and suffer injury, we should deem his action criminal.5
To be sure, the second and third positions point in the opposite di‐
rection, narrowing criminal liability. Yet they appear to do so in absurd
ways. Should the terrorist who unequivocally plans to bomb an airplane
be immune from any criminal sanction simply because he is confident
3
I say “criminal culpability” and not “criminal liability” because the authors do acknowledge
that consequentialist values could militate against criminal liability in some situations even though
the actor is criminally culpable (pp 321–24) (discussing the burden of proof, plea bargaining, and
other sentencing considerations).
4
“Counting crime types,” the authors assert, “is easy for us: we have only one crime—
manifesting insufficient concern for others’ legally protected interests” (p 246).
5
The authors provide a comparable example, Frankie, discussed below in Part III.A.2.
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that the explosive device cannot possibly be triggered until he pushes a
switch? And should every actor who lacks awareness of the specific
risks he is creating also be impervious to punishment, regardless of how
obvious the risks would be to most actors and how blameworthy he is
for not paying attention to them?
But I am a friendly critic. In my view, these positions, and the ar‐
guments for them, are coherent, illuminating, provocative and indeed
sometimes extreme, but not (quite) absurd.6
In this Review, I focus on the third and fourth positions. The first
and second positions have been much discussed in the literature,
though the authors do bring fresh analysis to bear on them.7 (I happen
to agree in large part with the authors on the first point, and disagree
with them on the second.)
The combined effect of the authors’ four positions would be to ex‐
pand the criminal law very substantially in many cases. The second and
third positions do militate in the other direction, but one should not
overstate their limiting implications. The “last act” requirement, for
example, permits criminal liability in a wider range of situations than
first appears. An actor who carries a loaded gun, believing that he prob‐
ably can prevent it from causing harm, will often recognize that there is
a small chance that he cannot (because, for example, he might drop it or
it might discharge in a struggle); if he so recognizes, then he has indeed
recklessly unleashed an unjustifiable risk of harm, albeit a much smaller
(and thus less culpable) one than he unleashes after he pulls the trigger
(pp 217–18).8
6

The second position, I must say, is precariously proximate to the precipice of the preposterous.
For example, the authors provide intuitively powerful counterexamples to the claim that
results should matter for criminal liability. In “The Satanic Cult,” twenty people, in order to join a
gang, each fire a gun at the victim, knowing that only one rifle contains a live shell, but not knowing
whether he has fired the deadly shot; the authors plausibly argue that we should not care which
one is the actual killer (p 175). “The Broken Window” is a similar case of two children creating
equivalent risks of harm, but only one actually breaking a window (p 176). The authors also identify
an underappreciated problem with the “results matter” position: if negative results increase blame‐
worthiness, why do fortuitous positive results not decrease blameworthiness (pp 178–80)? With
respect to their claim that anything short of the “last act” of risk creation is insufficient for criminal
liability, they offer strong reasons for rejecting the alternative view that firm intentions are suffi‐
ciently culpable acts (pp 199–210). Those reasons include the conditionality of such intentions and
the opacity and indeterminacy of the actor’s associated beliefs about the risks he is running and
about his reasons (pp 203–06).
8
“Even Superman commits a culpable act by firing a gun because the sudden appearance of
kryptonite may prevent him from stopping the speeding bullet” (p 199 n 2). A nice example, but
misleading: to be culpable under the authors’ approach, Superman must be reckless; he must ac‐
tually consciously believe that there is some chance that he will suddenly be exposed to kryptonite
and thereby be disabled from catching up to the bullet. If Superman is superconfident or is simply
oblivious to that chance, he will not be culpable.
Of course, if the actor is aware of some chance that the victim will suffer fear as a result of his
inchoate act of brandishing the gun, the actor is, on the authors’ theory, culpable for unleashing the
7
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Before we turn to some of the larger themes, it is worth highlight‐
ing a handful of the authors’ highly original arguments with respect to
more particular issues. These are just illustrations of the creativity and
wide range of the authors’ analysis.


Self‐defense doctrine conventionally imposes two independent
requirements for the use of force: necessity and proportionality.
But is the former just a component of the latter (p 117)?



Conventional doctrine disfavors defensive claims of mistake of
criminal law. But should we more readily allow such a defense
when the crime at issue, such as a crime penalizing possession of
machine‐guns or a crime presuming that those below a certain
age are incapable of consent, is merely a proxy for a legitimate
state interest (pp 154–55)? And conversely, should we punish for
attempting a proxy crime, notwithstanding the usual rule that true
legal impossibility is a complete defense (pp 312–13)?



The conventional requirement that an accomplice or co‐
conspirator act with the “purpose” to assist the principal or
other conspirator is overly narrow (and is often not rigorously
applied). Can a “recklessness” criterion help solve these prob‐
lems by reconceptualizing inchoate crimes as crimes in which
one actor recklessly increases the risk that another will commit
a crime (p 223)?9



How do we determine the culpability of one who violates a deon‐
tological constraint, especially if the risk is consequentially justi‐
fiable (p 287)?10

risk of causing fear, though not necessarily for unleashing the risk of causing physical injury (p
218).
I think the authors are too quick, however, to assume that an actor who intends to harm a vic‐
tim and has come perilously close to doing so almost inevitably will actually believe that he has
unleashed a risk that he cannot fully control (p 220). (Suppose he is about to light the fuse of a
bomb or about to pull a loaded gun from his pocket.) Very often, actors who are bent on harming
another form no specific beliefs of this sort; at most, they believe (in a vague sort of way) that they
will probably succeed in what they are trying to do. In Part III.B, I discuss in more detail the requi‐
site particularity, and degree of consciousness, of beliefs under the authors’ theory.
9
Specifically, under the authors’ approach, there is no need for separate crimes of solicita‐
tion, conspiracy, and accomplice liability. All are just cases of recklessly increasing the risks that
others will commit crimes, through unjustifiably risking, encouraging, or aiding others’ criminality.
This approach also avoids the need to prove that the actor had the purpose to assist some specific
crime, as opposed to proving that he risked that the other might commit any one of a range of
crimes (pp 223–24).
10 The authors note that this problem is analogous to the problem of justifying a threshold
version of deontology (p 287).
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Could society (as opposed to an individual defendant) be “ex‐
cused” for certain policies, such as preventively detaining the
sane but dangerous (p 150)?

Finally, this Review concentrates upon some critical issues of prin‐
ciple and theory that the authors’ arguments raise. However, their posi‐
tions would engender significant problems of practical administration—
problems that the authors do attempt to address in Part Four of Crime
and Culpability, but that remain quite serious.11
II. CONSEQUENTIALISTS IN RETRIBUTIVIST CLOTHING ?
Before turning to the details of the authors’ arguments with respect
to the third and fourth positions, let us pause to consider the wider pic‐
ture. The authors helpfully situate their specific arguments within
broader debates about the proper scope of retributivism or just deserts.
They endorse a moderate, and partially consequentialist, version of re‐
tributivism (p 8). This version is stronger than the view (often denomi‐
nated “negative retributivism”) that just deserts serves only as a side
constraint on punishment, forbidding punishment in excess of desert;
however, it is weaker than the view (one type of “affirmative retributiv‐
ism”) that if an offender deserves punishment, the state is mandated to
impose it (p 7). Rather, they believe that just punishment is one good
among many, and sometimes can be outweighed by other goods (p 9).
11 For example, the authors rely heavily on standards rather than rules to define criminal
conduct. They justify this, in part, by the assertion that our current codes also rely very heavily on
standards (p 292). But this claim is an exaggeration. Although legal criteria of reasonableness,
negligence, and recklessness do require that a risk be unjustifiable, and thus do employ standards,
such criteria only rarely are decisive. Indeed, they are often not at all significant in routine criminal
prosecutions. For example, even if a theft or drug offense formally requires recklessness as to the
amount of property stolen or drugs possessed, it would be extraordinarily rare for the justifiability
of the actor’s theft or possession to be a genuine issue. By contrast, their proposal, if implemented,
would dramatically expand the use of standards in routine cases.
More specifically, their sample jury instruction (pp 327–29) gives absolutely no guidance to ju‐
rors about what kinds of “reasons” do or do not justify creating a risk. The jury is simply told:

For behavior to be justified, the reasons that the actor has for engaging in his behavior should
be weighed against the risk that the actor perceives that his conduct will cause a prohibited
result or results.
…
The actor’s reasons for action include not only the reason or reasons that motivate his con‐
duct but also any other reason that might justify his conduct of which he is aware. These rea‐
sons should be accorded weight by (1) their positive or negative force and (2) the actor’s per‐
ception of the likelihood that the facts underlying the reasons do or will obtain (p 328).
Although the authors do suggest that the criminal code might codify the weight of different le‐
gally protected interests and of different reasons for creating risks, and might provide clarifying
commentary, they also propose that the jury first make the extremely open‐ended determination
whether the risks outweigh the reasons (pp 278–79).
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Throughout the book, the authors offer examples of specific contexts in
which the good of calibrating an actor’s punishment to his just deserts
might indeed be outweighed by other social values, including deterring
crime, reducing administrative costs, and conforming to distributive jus‐
tice (pp 10, 322).
I have no quarrel with this moderate general stance. But I do have a
quarrel with the unexpectedly consequentialist tenor of their argument
for a retributivist account of culpability. It is one thing to balance the
good of retributive justice against consequentialist values. It is quite
another to profess to offer a mainly retributivist account of culpability
but then to pervasively employ consequentialist reasoning in fleshing
out that account.
Thus, on the first page of the text, the authors flatly declare, “the
criminal law aims at preventing harm” (p 3). This consequentialist as‐
sertion is surprising in two ways. First, a system of criminal laws might
do a very good job of preventing harm, yet in so doing might punish the
innocent or punish out of all proportion to desert. The authors, as pro‐
fessed retributivists, could not countenance this state of affairs. Second, if
some particular criminal law doctrine or practice is completely ineffective
at preventing or reducing the risk of harm, then on this reasoning, that
doctrine or practice would be unjustifiable; yet affirmative retributivists
believe that one important reason for the criminal law is to afford just
deserts, even when this does not reduce crime.
The authors are aware of these problems and make some effort to
respond to them. But why do they begin with the assumption that crim‐
inal law aims to prevent harm? Why not describe its aims as both pre‐
venting harm and giving wrongdoers their just deserts?12
One possible reason for their surprising endorsement of conse‐
quentialism is this: they insist that an actor is culpable only if he is in
some sense reachable by the criminal law (p 6). I largely agree with this
premise; but the premise does not entail either: (1) that the underlying
justification for criminal law must be to prevent harm, or (2) that the
particular doctrines of criminal law cannot legitimately be applied to a
particular defendant unless they are capable of influencing him.
12 Of course, what counts as culpable action in the first place—an action that triggers the
state’s right to punish according to what the actor deserves—often depends on the specific future
harms or wrongs the actor intended or risked. Attempted murder depends on an intention to kill;
reckless driving depends on the anticipated future risks of harm. But this is a completely distinct
point. The mere fact that we often properly take an ex ante perspective in determining culpability does
not convert a nonconsequentialist theory into a consequentialist one. See Kenneth W. Simons, Tort
Negligence, CostBenefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the Controversy, 41 Loyola LA L Rev
1171, 1188–89 (2008) (arguing that justifications like self‐defense similarly take an ex ante perspec‐
tive, a perspective that can be explained through a consequentialist assessment of risk and future
harm, but that can also be explained on moral and nonconsequentialist grounds).
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Thus, the authors are right that it would be unfair to punish those
who are completely incapable of abiding by criminal law norms—for
example, due to infancy, insanity, or excusable ignorance. And they are
right that the criminal law presupposes that people act for reasons. But
they are wrong to then insist that punishment is apt only in those situa‐
tions when the law can influence those reasons (p 6).
Consider two counterexamples to their claim. Suppose a terrorist
expects to die in the course of his violent attack. He deserves serious
punishment even if the prospect of criminal punishment cannot affect
his decision to commit a crime. Or suppose a less extreme case: Dan, the
wayward moralist. Dan has an anger management problem. He is also
deeply religious, believing that he owes a strong moral duty to treat oth‐
ers without violence and with utmost respect. Indeed, his moral beliefs
are so strong that the criminal law has absolutely no effect on him.
Sometimes he loses his temper and physically assaults his friends and
family. He is enormously ashamed and humiliated by his own behavior,
to such a degree that even if there were no criminal law, or even if it
imposed either less severe or more severe punishments, his conduct
would be no different. Sometimes he is able to resist his urges, but often
he is not. When he commits a crime, does he deserve criminal punish‐
ment? Many retributivists would answer yes, even though in his case,
the law cannot influence his reasons or his behavior. Given the authors’
endorsement of moderate retributivism, which holds that just deserts is
sometimes a sufficient reason for punishment, they should support pu‐
nishment of Dan, even though the law cannot influence Dan’s reasons.
In short, I agree with the authors that responsiveness to reasons is
a plausible requirement of any retributive theory, but I do not agree that
responsiveness to the criminal law is an inexorable requirement. (Res‐
ponsiveness to the criminal law might be a sensible requirement of the
consequentialist element of their mixed approach to punishment; how‐
ever, that is a distinct claim.)
To be sure, it is difficult to imagine any real‐world criminal justice
system that does not significantly influence the extent to which people
commit crimes. At the very least, enactment and enforcement of crimi‐
nal law rules have the effect of reinforcing social norms, which in turn
quite clearly influence the incidence of criminal behavior. Indeed, the
authors claim that norm‐inculcation is the only proper way, under a re‐
tributivist approach, for the criminal law to prevent harm (pp 6–7).
Norm‐reinforcement is also central to their conception of retribution in
another way—it explains why we properly blame those who violate
criminal law norms:
[T]he inculcation of such norms involves as its corollary the incul‐
cation of reactive attitudes toward those who comply with and
those who violate the norms. The negative reactive attitudes, to be
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directed at those who choose to violate the norms, include both
blame and the sense that punishment is fitting (p 6).
Nevertheless, a purely nonconsequentialist criminal law that has
little or no influence on the incidence of crime, not even by way of norm‐
reinforcement, is entirely conceivable. Imagine, for example, that we
were able to prevent almost all crime by means of noncriminal legal
institutions such as civil regulation, systems of preventive detention, tort
law, mental health institutions, and other social programs. And suppose
a few crimes continue to be committed—by people like Dan, or, more
likely, by people who rationally calculate that the risk of prosecution for
their particular crime will be less than their anticipated benefits from
the crime. Principles of just deserts would still demand that these re‐
maining criminals be punished.
The authors’ surprisingly consequentialist account of the founda‐
tion of culpability has problematic implications later in the book when
they turn to more specific issues. For example, when they argue for a
“last act” requirement, one of their rationales is that the criminal law
aims to influence the actor’s reasons for action; so if an actor who in‐
tends to harm or endanger another still is able to change his mind and
decide not to unleash the risk, the law remains capable of influencing
him, and he should not be criminally liable (pp 198–99, 212–14, 216).
But, again, an actor might be completely insensitive to the criminal law,
yet still amenable to moral or other reasons for reconsidering his
wrongful intent; should the latter not be the test of whether he has
committed the last act?
A second example is the authors’ incentive‐based argument that
the law should not require an actor faced with a choice of a greater, less‐
er, and least evil to choose the least. Suppose a runaway trolley will kill
five unless it is redirected either to track A, where it will kill two, or to
track B, where it will kill one (p 105). The actor is considering whether
to redirect the trolley. If the law were to permit him to redirect the trol‐
ley only if he chooses the least evil, that is, only if he chooses to redirect
it to track B, not track A, then, they worry, the actor might choose nei
ther the lesser nor the least evil, but might simply allow the greater evil
to occur, an option that the law normally will consider permissible (p
104–08).13 But here, too, it should be irrelevant on a retributivist ac‐
13 The authors’ approach might also appear to be too consequentialist insofar as it requires a
comprehensive, systematic balancing of risks, reasons, and duration of risk, in determining wheth‐
er the risky act is culpable. Some will object that this is just a utilitarian cost‐benefit analysis, simi‐
lar to the Learned Hand test of tort negligence, and equally indefensible if one is a genuine noncon‐
sequentialist.
I am happy to leap to their defense here. I agree that we must balance the advantages and disad‐
vantages of taking a precaution to judge an actor’s negligence in tort law. And we might similarly want
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count how this actor or similarly situated actors will respond to the
law’s incentives. (It is also a bit unlikely that anyone but a few philoso‐
phers or law professors would even recognize, in the real world, that they
are facing a choice between the “lesser” and the “least” evil.) The proper
question, rather, is whether a choice of lesser rather than least evil can be
justified as consistent with retributive values.14
III. THE PROBLEMATIC RECKLESSNESS CRITERION
Let us turn to the authors’ analysis of recklessness and investigate
two critical questions. Can recklessness really suffice as the sole crite‐
rion of culpability? And, is their requirement of “conscious awareness”
of risk too demanding?
A.

Recklessness as the Supposed Single Criterion of Culpability

One of the most arresting of the authors’ claims is that they can re‐
duce culpability to a single criterion, recklessness, that would swallow up
and replace all other criteria such as purpose, knowledge, recklessness
as defined in the Model Penal Code, extreme indifference, and willful
blindness (p 41).15

to balance the risks and the reasons for choosing to take a risky course of action when we are judging
criminal culpability. But in both cases, the balance need not, and should not, aim simply to maximize
utility or welfare. See id.
14 For a tentative negative answer, see Kenneth W. Simons, Exploring the Intricacies of the
Lesser Evils Defense, 24 L & Phil 645, 653–54 (2005) (explaining that if permission either to choose
or not to choose the lesser evil is autonomy‐based, then arguably an actor who chooses to act
forfeits any objection to then being required to choose the least rather than lesser evil).
15 I am surprised, however, at the authors’ criticism of the willful blindness doctrine, under
which a mens rea of knowledge is deemed to include some cases in which the actor lacks knowledge
only because she deliberately avoids confirming the relevant facts (pp 33–35). That doctrine is
intended to accomplish just what they want to achieve with their two‐variable recklessness crite‐
rion: avoid the inflexibility of the knowledge‐recklessness distinction and treat certain especially
culpable cases of cognitive recklessness as harshly as cases of knowledge. See Kenneth W. Simons,
Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 Ohio St J Crim L 179, 196–98
(2003) (arguing that an exclusively cognitive criterion for distinguishing between knowledge and
recklessness is too narrow).
In their example, a mule knows there is a 1 percent chance that his suitcase contains illegal
drugs. The willful blindness doctrine would treat him as “knowing” if the reason why he does not
inquire into whether his suitcase contains drugs (though he could easily do so) is in order to remain
part of the criminal gang and obtain illegal profits (p 34). The doctrine thus is entirely consistent
with the authors’ approach, which looks both at the perceived risk and at the (good or bad) rea‐
sons for running the risk. Here, the mule has a socially unacceptable reason for not inquiring fur‐
ther, and this plausibly elevates his 1 percent estimation of the risk that he is smuggling to roughly
the level of culpability of another (knowing) actor who is 90 percent sure that his suitcase contains
illegal drugs. Deeming such a reckless actor to be “knowing” is not “absurd” (p 34), but is simply a
way of expressing their comparable culpability. By contrast, if the mule is willing to take a 1 percent
risk that he is smuggling drugs for a much less culpable reason, for example to show friendship to a
person he admires, he is not comparable in culpability to a knowing actor.
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Their basic idea is powerful and elegant: replace all mens rea terms
with just one, reckless risking, involving only two variables: (1) how
probable the actor subjectively believes the risk to be, and (2) what rea‐
sons the actor has for imposing the risk (p 24).
And if the actor poses risks to several protected interests, such as
life, bodily integrity, and property, then: simply aggregate the risks he
believes he is imposing (pp 46–47). (They call this a “holistic” approach
to the risks, but “aggregate” is a more accurate term.16)
According to the authors, “knowledge” (for example, that one will
cause a death) is just the extreme case on the first axis of culpability, for
it is a belief that the risk is almost certain to be realized (p 32). And
“purpose” (for example, to cause death) is just an extreme case on the
second axis, because an intention to kill is ordinarily one of the most
unjustifiable types of reasons (p 39).
Is “reckless risking” a persuasive simplification of mens rea and ac‐
tus reus categories? Regrettably, it is not. On closer examination, this
approach: (1) is unlikely, in operation, to radically simplify the criminal
law; (2) cannot, in principle, avoid making complex and subtle qualita‐
tive, rather than merely scalar, distinctions; and (3) creates a significant
ambiguity, namely about whether the “insufficient concern” (p 24) that
recklessness exhibits actually operates as a criterion of culpability. I ad‐
dress these points in turn.
1. Radical simplification is unattainable in practice.
First, I doubt that the new approach, once implemented, will simpl‐
ify nearly as much as the authors imply. Compare two cases. D5 shoots a
gun at a victim, wanting him dead. D6 shoots a gun in the air, believing
there is only a small risk of death. The authors would expect the jury,
applying their approach, to categorize D5’s act as more culpable than
D6’s. But, the authors concede, the jury should not have complete dis‐
Perhaps the authors’ objection is that automatically classifying willful blindness as “knowledge”
oversimplifies the analysis, given that knowledge can be more or less culpable than recklessness, de‐
pending on context. But the point of the willful blindness doctrine is to underscore that even though in
many or most contexts cognitive recklessness (in the sense of awareness of a substantial but not very
high risk of harm) is less culpable than knowledge, sometimes it is just as culpable.
16 In philosophical discourse, holism is a concept quite distinct from aggregation of risks: it is
the idea that the whole cannot be reduced to any simple, invariant formula combining the parts, or that
the meaning and significance of the parts depend on the larger whole of which they are a part. See
Jonathan Dancy, Moral Particularism, in Edward N. Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/moral‐particularism (visited Oct 29,
2009); Ned Block, Holism, Mental and Semantic, in Edward Craig, ed, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philoso
phy Online (Routledge 1998), online at http://rep.routledge.com/article/W015 (visited Oct 29, 2009)
(“Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of a
sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences comprising a
whole theory or group of theories.”).
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cretion to make this type of culpability judgment on a case‐by‐case basis
(pp 280–81). Rather, they make several suggestions about how to con‐
strain that discretion when their theory is implemented in practice: (1)
the legislature should establish predetermined weights for different le‐
gally protected interests and for different types of reasons; (2) the judge
should employ a sentencing matrix; and (3) the legislature could place
commentaries within the criminal code and employ presumptions (pp
280–82, 285–86, 307–09). They anticipate, in short, that the law will
crystallize into at least a weak version of current criminal codes. For
example, it is likely to produce distinct de facto crimes of what we would
now call attempted murder for actors like D5, and reckless discharge of
a firearm for actors like D6.
2. The “risks versus reasons” formula requires subtle qualitative
distinctions.
Second, even in the abstract, the apparent simplicity of this “risks
versus reasons” formula is deceptive. The elaboration of the formula will
require subtle, complex distinctions. Those distinctions are much more
qualitative and nuanced than the scalar “risk versus reasons” formula
(roughly modeled on the scalar Learned Hand test (p 81)17) that the au‐
thors initially suggest will suffice.
The category of “reasons” for imposing a risk is especially com‐
plex. The possible reasons are numerous and varied, and encompass a
wide range of qualitatively distinct considerations that have their own
intricate structure. This structure, once fully articulated, might well be at
least as elaborate as the structure of the Model Penal Code or other mod‐
ern criminal codes.
Thus, under the Model Penal Code, recklessness requires both that
the actor is aware of a substantial risk and that the risk is unjustifiable18
(though the Code provides little guidance about what counts as unjustifi‐
able). But when it addresses knowing or purposeful causation of serious
harm, the Code permits justification only in very narrow circums‐
17

See Simons, 41 Loyola LA L Rev at 1172–73 (cited in note 12):

In the famous Learned Hand formulation [of negligence, an actor] should take a precaution if,
but only if, the marginal costs (or “burden,” “B”) of that precaution (in the form of the tangible
costs of the precaution or the lost benefits that taking the precaution would entail) are less
than its marginal benefits (in the form of reduced risks of injury, measured by multiplying the
probability (“P”) of the injury times the magnitude (“L”) of the injury if it occurs).
Judge Learned Hand first announced this test in United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169,
173 (2d Cir 1947).
18 See MPC § 2.02(2)(c) (stating the requirement for recklessness that the actor “consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct”).
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tances—mainly, only in cases of self‐defense or lesser evils. Something
quite similar is very likely to evolve under the authors’ culpability
scheme.19
The authors themselves recognize quite a bit of qualitative variation
within the “reasons” that might justify a risk. They mention four types of
reasons, which they concede will have to be spelled out further:
[T]he jury should consider whether the actor’s reasons were evil,
substantially enhancing the actor’s culpability; antisocial, enhanc‐
ing the actor’s culpability; trivial, leaving the actor’s culpability un‐
affected; decent, reducing the culpability substantially, but insuffi‐
cient to justify the act; or weighty enough to justify or require the
act socially (justification) or personally (excuse).
...
[T]hese reasons will have to be spelled out more elaborately. We
are not able here to list all of the reasons that would fall into each
category (p 285).20
Consider two other significant qualitative dimensions of such “rea‐
sons”—the significance of the actor’s intentions relative to her beliefs,
and the role of consent. On a plausible nonconsequentialist account of
permissible risk creation, if someone acts with the intention to harm or
intention to expose someone to what she believes to be level L of risk,
then (all else being equal) she displays greater culpability than if she
acts while merely believing that she is exposing someone to level L of
risk. Indeed, despite the authors’ assertion to the contrary, the existence
vel non of a purpose or intention to harm will often trump differences
in belief in the probability of success. Suppose Kim wants to kill me, but
also wants the killing to be a bit more exciting and more of a challenge.
So she deliberately fires her gun (containing only one bullet) from the
other side of the room. Larry also wants to kill me and simply fires the
gun point blank. Is Kim really significantly less culpable merely because
she believes she is imposing only a 30 percent rather than a 99 percent
risk of death?21
19 The authors seem to concede as much (pp 42–43).
I do agree with the authors that the Model Penal Code’s “substantial risk” threshold for reck‐
lessness should be rejected, or at least supplemented by a provision that if the actor has an espe‐
cially unjustifiable reason for imposing the risk, he may not impose even a “less than substantial”
risk (p 27). See Simons, 1 Ohio St J Crim L at 190–92 (cited in note 15).
20 Elsewhere, the authors indicate that relevant features of “reasons” include their “weight”
(p 27), and whether the reasons are “misanthropic” (p 27) or “frivolous” (such as obtaining a thrill)
(p 33).
21 Similarly, the authors concede that if a circumstance (such as the victim’s nonconsent) is a
motivating reason for the actor’s engaging in sexual intercourse with her, that is more culpable
than if the actor is simply aware of that circumstance (or, I would add, than if the actor merely
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Another crucial qualitative distinction is consent, either actual or hy‐
pothetical. When risks are extremely low, those who are exposed to the
risks often consent to them, or would consent if they had full information
about the risks. That consent often justifies the risk imposition. The au‐
thors provide some instructive and troubling examples of very low‐level
risk imposition, in which even a very carefully conducted activity in prin‐
ciple seems to be impermissible because the actor’s reason for acting is
immoral (or simply has little weight) (p 48). But consent helps explain
why these examples need not be viewed as culpable acts.
Consider one of the authors’ memorable characters, Deborah, who
drives carefully but obtains only the slightest enjoyment from doing so (p
50). It is, the authors plausibly suggest, a close case whether her conduct
is justifiable, inasmuch as even careful driving creates risks to others. But
if other drivers and pedestrians would have no objection to her safe driv‐
ing for very slight reasons, her conduct does seem justifiable. Compare
another of the authors’ ingenious examples, Frankie, who drives carefully
towards the house of a person she intends to murder. Is her act of driving
unjustified and reckless? The authors conclude that it is (p 50). This
seems correct, since she is the only one who benefits from the drive, and
the benefit she obtains is of course without social value. But suppose she
chooses to drive carefully to the victim’s house rather than bicycle there
because this mode of transportation permits her to drop a friend off at the
store along the way. Even this very small social benefit from her careful
driving probably suffices to make her driving justifiable.22 When the risks
are this small, either consent or a small social benefit can make the risky
act nonculpable.
hopes or desires that she does not consent even if he is not motivated thereby) (p 40). See Kenneth
W. Simons, Does Punishment for “Culpable Indifference” Simply Punish for “Bad Character”? Examin
ing the Requisite Connection between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 Buff Crim L Rev 219, 243–47
(2003) (arguing that some causal but nonmotivational desires are relevant to criminal liability).
22 Compare an example from a leading criminal law casebook: D gives a gift of an airplane
ticket to his hated aunt, hoping the plane will crash, which it does. If this result is genuinely fortuit‐
ous—that is, D has no reason to believe that this plane is more unsafe than any other—then someone
in the position of V might be happy to accept the ticket as a gift. (Suppose D is a crazy, wealthy person
who gives away thousands of plane tickets, hoping thereby to kill some of the recipients.) Given that
each recipient expects to benefit ex ante from the gift, D’s risk creation might well be justifiable. See
Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer, and Carol S. Steiker, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and
Materials 227–28 (Aspen 8th ed 2007) (proposing the example).
The authors are correct that we perhaps assume too readily that “driving” is an innocuous and
justifiable activity, merely because it is so familiar and commonplace. As they point out, if Frankie
instead walked to the victim’s house with a gun strapped to her back and it misfired, we would not
hesitate to judge her reckless (pp 50–51). This is so, I would add, even if the risk she believed the
gun posed was no greater than the risk she believed she would have posed if she had driven care‐
fully to the house. Nevertheless, careful driving, even for an improper purpose, may indeed be
justifiable if its risks are quite small and are consented to, whereas it is much less likely that the
endangered public does or hypothetically would consent even to the very small risks posed by a
person carrying a gun.
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Finally, the apparent simplicity of the “risks versus reasons” for‐
mula is also belied by the inevitable complexity of the “risk” half of the
recklessness equation. The authors endorse a largely consequentialist
balance of risks and reasons, but a nonconsequentialist account of risk
can and should also consider the distribution and concentration of the
risks that the actor creates.23 In mathematical terms, the culpability
function of the relevant variables might not be purely continuous and
smooth.24 To use an example of Leo Katz’s, if someone is speeding to
the hospital to save a very sick passenger, it is more unjustifiable for the
driver to knowingly kill one pedestrian in order to save five passengers,
than to create a 20 percent risk of killing one pedestrian in order to save
one passenger.25 The first scenario is more unjustifiable even though the
same five‐to‐one ratio of benefit to harm characterizes both scenarios.
This difference constitutes one sense in which “knowingly” causing
death is worse than “recklessly” causing death (in the Model Penal
Code’s sense of these terms). More precisely, it is not just worse, it is
disproportionately worse. And this suggests that knowledge differs from
recklessness, not just in degree along a cognitive culpability axis (as the
authors claim), but in kind.
3. Is “insufficient concern” a term of art or a criterion of cul‐
pability?
Third, the authors often say that a “reckless” act in their sense de‐
monstrates “insufficient concern” (p 24), but the quoted phrase can be
understood in one of two very different ways. It could be a mere label, a
term of art for unjustifiable and inexcusable acts. On this view, the actual
standards for determining the actor’s culpability require us to look at
more specific criteria of justification and excuse, of whether the actor

23 The authors do address some of these nonconsequentialist features. They point out, for
example, that there might be a moral distinction between imposing risks on “statistical” rather than
identifiable victims:

Suppose, for example, that the risks of tunnel building were concentrated on one known indi‐
vidual—Sam. Sam lives near the construction site, has a rare medical condition such that re‐
petitive jack‐hammering will eventually cause him to die, and cannot be moved. If tunnel
building’s benefits justify the loss of several statistical lives, does it likewise justify the killing of
Sam? It is possible that some acts are justifiable only if, from our ungodlike epistemic vantage
point, the risks of an act are borne by many individuals rather than concentrated on one—
even if God knows the one on whom the harm will actually fall, and whose risk is therefore
one (p 65).
24 In their sketch of how a factfinder should combine the “risk versus reason” variables in an
actual sentencing decision, the authors assume a simple aggregative formula: (1) for each type or
degree of harm, we multiply the perceived probability and the associated harm, and (2) we then
sum these results (pp 282–85).
25 Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, 16 Soc Phil & Pol 52, 65 (1999).
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lacks sufficient reasons for the risks he believes himself to be imposing
(p 102). But, alternatively, insufficient concern could actually be an
operative evaluative criterion of when acts are indeed unjustifiable and
inexcusable. When, in murder prosecutions, courts instruct the jury to
determine whether the actor demonstrated “extreme indifference” to
human life, they often mean this in the second sense: they want the jury
to decide whether the actor’s conduct showed that his attitude towards
the victim was extraordinarily uncaring and callous.
For the most part, the authors interpret “insufficient concern” in
the first sense, as a term of art (p 44).26 They give the example of Darla,
who plays Russian roulette with Abe, of whom she is very fond (pp 43–
44). When Darla pulls the trigger and causes Abe’s death, she is in one
sense not indifferent: she cares deeply about Abe and might be devas‐
tated by his death. If “caring” about the welfare of the victim were the
only operative criterion of culpability, we might not consider Darla to be
culpable. “Nevertheless,” the authors explain, “we may still say that her
choice, to play Russian roulette, manifests culpable indifference to hu‐
man life” (p 44). However, on at least two occasions, the authors employ
the second interpretation. In doing so, they both sully the purity of their
basic “risk versus reasons” criterion of culpability and raise doubts
about whether that criterion is sufficient to explain all relevant dimen‐
sions of culpability.
Thus, the authors suggest that “quality of contemplation”—
whether the actor premeditated or instead decided quickly, and whether
his rationality was impaired—should play a substantial role in determin‐
ing the level of deserved punishment (pp 284–85). “[I]f we hold risks
and reasons constant, an actor who has more time to reflect and still
chooses to risk harming another manifests insufficient concern to a
greater extent than someone who acts without that opportunity” (p
284) (emphasis added). This is a significant qualification of the “risk
versus reasons” culpability formula. Moreover, the emphasized language
clearly reflects the second conception of insufficient concern, for it treats
insufficient concern as a single scalar property. I believe that the authors
run into difficulty here because they have chosen to employ the evalua‐
tively laded, misleading terminology “insufficient concern”; instead, they
26 Indeed, the authors devote several pages to a critique of the argument that “culpable indif‐
ference” or similarly culpable forms of inadvertence should operate as a criterion of culpability (pp
71–77) (analyzing the views of Simons, Victor Tadros, and Stephen Garvey). I agree with the authors
that the criminal law should not simply ask whether an actor’s attitude towards the victim or the
victim’s fate is “indifferent” or “insufficiently caring.” We must indeed consider whether the actual
choices and actions of the actor display indifference. “Culpable indifference” is not negated simply
because the Russian roulette player or the murderer feels enormous remorse after killing the victim.
See Simons, 6 Buff Crim L Rev at 220–22, 260–67 (cited in note 21). However, I do not have space
here to respond to the authors’ critique of my views on this issue.
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should have employed an unambiguously conclusory label for the varie‐
ty of factors—including risks, reasons, beliefs, intentions, and quality of
deliberation—that they believe affect and constitute criminal culpability.
(On the other hand, a less misleading, more accurate, but still pithy label
does not spring immediately to mind: “Insufficient reasons in light of
the risks and the quality of deliberation” is not the most felicitous
phrase.)
As a second illustration of the authors’ problematic use of “insuffi‐
cient concern” as an operative criterion, consider their discussion of
conflicting forms of justification, Suppose an actor acts wrongly in vi‐
olating deontological constraints, yet he acts in order to produce a very
beneficial consequentialist goal. (He tortures a terrorist to prevent a
possible terrorist attack.27) Here, they say, although violating the deonto‐
logical constraint is “the epitome of insufficient concern,” the actor’s
beneficent motive does not seem to engage our negative reactive atti‐
tudes (p 102). “Is it possible,” they ask, “that deontologically wrong acts
that have good consequences that D is aware of and motivated by pro‐
duce conflicting reactive attitudes—both blame and praise?” (p 102).
The authors have identified a genuine and difficult moral problem. But
their solution is troubling, for they appear to treat whether the commu‐
nity has a certain kind of reactive attitude to an act as an important indi‐
cium of whether that act demonstrated insufficient concern. Yet by pro‐
ceeding in this direction, beginning with the community’s reaction in
order to determine whether the act was sufficiently culpable to deserve
punishment, they generate a significant problem. Now, “insufficient con‐
cern” seems to reflect the second interpretation, an interpretation that
the authors generally disavow. Indeed, it appears to reflect a particularly
unattractive version of that interpretation, insofar as “negative reactive
attitudes” might simply reflect the emotional, ill‐considered, vengeful reac‐
tions of the community.
B.

The Requirement of Conscious Awareness of Risk

The authors’ insistence that culpability requires “conscious
awareness” of the risk invites two sets of inquiries. Is their requirement
of “conscious awareness” of risk too demanding? They respond to this
concern by significantly watering down what conscious awareness ac‐
tually entails. But when they dilute the requirement in this way, is the
requirement too undemanding? Does it undermine the choice‐based
27 This is my own example. The authors’ actual examples are either much less plausible in‐
stances of justified action (a surgeon kills an innocent person to save five patients who need the
victim’s organs to survive) or much more plausible instances (D borrows a rowboat to save several
lives) (pp 101–02).
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character of their account? And does it eviscerate the distinction be‐
tween recklessness and negligence, a distinction that they claim is cru‐
cial to maintain?
The authors admit that a literal requirement that an actor be con‐
sciously aware of the specific risk that she is posing is too demanding (p
51). Accordingly, as we shall see, they modify this requirement by per‐
mitting an adulterated form of awareness to suffice.28 But, unfortunately,
they end up with a test that is either too indeterminate to be useful, or
that collapses into a version of a negligence test, which of course they
disavow (p 70).
Here is their problem. The authors are committed to the idea that
culpability depends on conscious choice, which in turn depends on con‐
scious awareness of the legally relevant facts. They are insistent on re‐
jecting criminal liability for negligent inadvertence, for two main rea‐
sons—because there is no principled, nonarbitrary way to define the
reasonable person in this context (pp 81–85), and because imposing
criminal punishment for negligent acts is unjust (pp 70–71). A brief
discussion of these two arguments is useful at this point, in order to
clarify why the authors are willing to interpret “consciousness of risk”
somewhat, but not too, flexibly.
The reasonable person construct is arbitrary, they assert, because
there is no coherent and defensible definition of such a reasonable per‐
son other than two extreme constructs, each of which is unacceptable (p
82). First, the reasonable person could be a person aware of all the facts
that actually bear on a correct moral decision. Second, the reasonable
person could be a person with all the actual beliefs of the actor. Neither
construct, the authors correctly conclude, is defensible, for the first col‐
lapses the distinction between strict liability and negligence, and the
second collapses the distinction between negligence and recklessness
(pp 82–83). But the authors have created a straw person here. Those of
us who believe that the reasonable person construct is indeed intelligi‐
ble and valuable in a range of moral and legal contexts29 endorse neither
of these two conceptions. Rather, the reasonable person is, essentially, a
person with the actual beliefs of the defendant, but with the capacity for
perception, reasoning, inference, investigation, motivation, and self‐
control that the community fairly expects of a person in his circums‐
tances.30 For example, if John pays no attention to whether Joan is con‐
senting to his sexual advances, his awareness that he is making sexual
advances should put him on notice—that is, would put the reasonable
28

See notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort
Law, 3 Theoretical Inq L 283 (2002).
30 Id at 311–15.
29
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person on notice—of the need to determine whether she is willing for
him to continue.
The second argument offered by the authors is more plausible,
though still unpersuasive. In cases of negligent inadvertence, they claim,
the actor lacks control over whether he is aware of the relevant risk;
accordingly, criminal punishment would be unjust (pp 83–85). The in‐
advertent actor, they say, has no internal reason to become aware, to
pay more attention, to focus on the facts that would tell her that she is
now posing an unjustified risk. In this sense, she has “no control” of
whether she is aware of the risk (p 83). Accordingly, punishment would
violate the maxim, “ought” implies “can” (pp 56–57). To their credit,
the authors offer an illustration that, to most observers, is a strong
counterexample to their thesis that negligent inadvertence is insuffi‐
cient for criminal liability:
Sam and Ruth are a self‐absorbed yuppie couple with a small child.
They are throwing a dinner party for some socially prominent
people who can help both of their careers and social standing . . . .
They put their child in the bathtub and begin drawing bathwater, but
just then the first guests begin to arrive. Sam and Ruth both go
downstairs to greet the guests, both realizing that the child would
be in grave danger if they failed to return and turn off the water,
but both believing correctly that at the rate the tub is filling, they
will have plenty of time to return to the child after they have wel‐
comed the guests. Of course, when they greet their guests they be‐
come so absorbed with making the right impression that both for‐
get about the child, with tragic consequences.
...
When they went downstairs they did not believe they were taking
any substantial risk with their child, perhaps no more substantial a
risk than we believe we are taking (for the sake of our careers)
when we attend a workshop and leave our children with a sitter. Of
course, once Sam and Ruth became engaged with their guests, the
child’s situation slipped out of their minds. And once the thought
was out of their minds, they had no power to retrieve it. They were
at the mercy of its popping back into their minds, which it did not
(pp 77–78).31
For reasons that I suggest below, this “lack of control” argument is
unpersuasive. But the argument provides the necessary background for
the authors’ answer to a critical question within their own theory

31

See also pp 83–84 (containing further discussion of the “no internal reason” argument).
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about the minimum culpability an actor must manifest in order to deserve
punishment: how aware must the actor be, and of what facts must he be
aware? Of course, a test requiring the actor to be consciously thinking,
while he is committing his criminal act, about exactly how risky his act is,
and in exactly what respect, is much too demanding. Many criminal acts
occur in an instant, in a blur, on impulse, or with only a vague recognition of
the risks the actor is running. This is true both for prima facie liability and
for defenses. When someone is suddenly attacked, for example, he might
simply lash out defensively, without consciously focusing on the risks of
harm he is posing to his attacker.32
The authors finesse this problem by requiring only “opaque” reck‐
lessness, not transparent recklessness. They say it is enough that the
actor merely has “preconscious” awareness of the specific risks she is
running (pp 51–58). For example, consider a driver (Red) who runs a
red light with the conscious awareness that this conduct is in some va‐
gue sense dangerous, but with only preconscious awareness of why or
to what extent this is dangerous. The authors would nevertheless treat
Red as aware of the specific risks that she would have been aware of, if
she thought about them for a second. (If she thought for a moment, she
would recognize that running the light might cause her to hit a pede‐
strian or cause an accident (p 52).)
But the authors are on slippery ground here—as they realize.
Consider a different actor, driving on the highway, who looks away
from the road for a couple of seconds in order to remove a CD from the
car’s CD player and insert a Green Day CD. If Green (as I call him) had
paused and thought for a moment, he also would immediately recognize
the risks of harm that his conduct posed. Yet Green is clearly not advert‐
ing to the risk when he changes the CD. Green seems to be simply negli‐
gent: he should have been paying attention to the risk, but he was not.
So, if under the authors’ analysis, we consider both Red and Green to be
sufficiently “conscious” of the risk, then the “consciousness” require‐
ment means very little.
The authors would likely reply that they can indeed distinguish Red
from Green. The opaque or preconscious aspects of Red’s decisionmak‐
ing, unlike Green’s, are still part of her choice, and still inform her prac‐
tical reasoning. When she consciously thinks, “this is dangerous,” she
must mean something, and whatever she means by this, is properly
treated as part of her conscious choice (pp 53–54).
But the authors’ phenomenological account is hardly the only
possible interpretation of Red’s state of mind. Suppose instead that
32 See Kenneth W. Simons, SelfDefense: Reasonable Beliefs or Reasonable Self
Control?, 11 New Crim L Rev 51, 61–62 (2008).
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when Red runs the red light, she thinks to herself, “I shouldn’t do this,”
but she has no clearly formed idea why she should not. She just knows
that running a light is against the rules or conventions of driving. Or,
suppose that while she runs the red light, Red actually sees a pedestrian
nearby, and has a sense of unease, but she does not specifically think,
“this is dangerous.” Indeed, compare Green. When he is changing the
CD, he might have a feeling of guilt or unease similar to Red’s, again
without being able to say exactly why.
In all of these cases, the actor has some kind of conscious notice
that she ought to be more careful. If any of these actors are conscious
enough to be considered criminally culpable, then arguably all of them
are, notwithstanding the authors’ arguments to the contrary.
Finally, imagine a variation of the Green example in which the actor
is even less conscious of the risk. Suppose that Green, while changing
the CD, has no awareness of danger or of risk, and not even a sense of
guilt or unease. But he would immediately admit, if the question were
put to him and he answered honestly, that he ought to pay more atten‐
tion to the road. He is of course aware that he is driving a car on a public
road and is aware that he is changing a CD. Thus, he is fully capable,
most of us would say, of paying just a little more attention to his sur‐
roundings, and thus of fully appreciating the risk. Why is his inadver‐
tence, which he could so easily overcome merely by paying attention,
not sufficiently culpable?
Of course, the authors want to avoid this slide down the slope into
punishing for mere negligent inadvertence. And there are some inde‐
pendently good reasons for resisting the slide.33 But the actual explana‐
tion that they give here does not suffice (pp 69–77).
A further problem with their analysis is how extraordinarily sensi‐
tive their culpability determination is to the precise subjective, precons‐
cious state of mind of the actor. Reconsider Red. She has a dim aware‐
ness that she is doing something dangerous, and this is enough, they
say, to count as recklessness (p 52). But what level of reckless risk has
she consciously created? Is she guilty of a serious crime of risking death,
or just a minor crime of risking only property damage? The answer, ac‐
cording to the authors, depends on what she would say if we asked her
why she thought running the red light was dangerous (p 52). (And if she
replied honestly.)
The implications of this approach are highly problematic. Red de‐
serves a very significant punishment if her vague feeling that her con‐

33 Criminal culpability should depend on a serious type and degree of moral fault. Not every
instance of negligent inadvertence or negligent lack of skill or competence should suffice for crimi‐
nal liability, even if it would suffice for tort liability or for ascription of minimal moral responsibility.
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duct is dangerous is due to a preconscious belief that she will likely kill a
pedestrian. But she deserves only a very minimal punishment if that
vague feeling is due to a preconscious belief that she will merely smash
into a parked car. Yet it is not even clear that there is a determinate an‐
swer to the question of which preconscious belief caused her to feel
that she was posing some kind of danger.34
Concededly, any account that gives weight to consciousness of risk in
determining criminal culpability is going to run into significant difficulties
of definition and characterization. But my objection is not just a quibble
about how to draw a line. The problem under the authors’ approach is very
serious. Their line marks the boundary between noncriminal and criminal
conduct. Moreover, on their view, the answer to a complex and indetermi‐
nate question, “Of what risks was defendant preconsciously aware?” could
make the difference between a criminal fine and life in prison. Accordingly,
it is fair to ask the authors, who so vigorously defend an account of culpa‐
bility premised on conscious choice, and who mock the suggestion that one
might legitimately employ any conception of risk other than a purely sub‐
jective one (pp 27–31),35 to explain more precisely and persuasively what
such a “choice” actually entails.
And finally, their account of preconscious awareness seems un‐
principled, for they are now premising criminal culpability on a diluted
type of choice. The actor who knows she is doing something dangerous,
but is not conscious of why it is dangerous, is not really either choosing
to endanger life, or instead merely choosing to risk minor injury or
property damage, and so forth. Rather, she is simply choosing to take
some kind of risk, without thinking through why or how her act is risky.
To be sure, if she were to consciously focus on why the act is risky,
she might immediately recognize that it is because of the risk of death.
But the fact remains: she did not actually consciously focus on this
34 Consider T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame 62–69 (Belknap
2008) (asserting that there may be no answer to the question which of two intentions “caused” or
motivated my action).
35 The authors validly point out certain difficulties, such as the problem of identifying the
relevant reference class, with conceptions of objective risk. But they move too quickly to the con‐
clusion that any nonsubjective conception is completely arbitrary.

One who drops a bowling ball from the top of a building to measure the force of gravity for himself,
and who believes there are people below whom he is putting in extreme danger, is reckless. This is
true despite the fact that his companion believes the risk is greater than he does; the building’s
doorman would have estimated the risk to be slightly lower; and a window washer, with a better
view below, knows that there are very few people below so that dropping the ball is unlikely to in‐
jure anyone. It simply makes no sense to allow the actor’s liability to hinge not upon what he knows,
or God knows, but upon the arbitrary selection among the friend, doorman, and window washer for
the correct perspective for assessing “objective risk” (pp 29–30).
However, the authors ignore an option that is both non‐arbitrary and plausible, namely, the risk as
perceived by a reasonable person in the shoes of the actor. See text accompanying note 30.
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when she acted. And so, the authors should say, she cannot help that she
did not focus, just as the authors do say, in cases of negligent inadver‐
tence such as Green, or Sam and Ruth, that the actor cannot help not
adverting to the risk (pp 77–78).
In other words, why is it not the case, both for Red and for Green,
that the actor has no “internal reason” to be consciously aware of the
precise risks that make her conduct dangerous (pp 83–84)? And why is it
not equally true in both cases that she has “no control” over whether she
is consciously thinking about the risk of death from running the light, or
the risk of property damage—or nothing at all (p 83)?
In all of these variations, the actor should be alert to the specific
risks, given the circumstance of which she is already aware. And in all of
these cases, it is relatively easy for her to take the next step. Red should
focus on the particular reason why she has a feeling of unease running
the red light. And Green should remind himself why he should not
change a CD while he is driving. Depending on the circumstances, both
actors might be sufficiently culpable to deserve at least minimal criminal
punishment.
One can find many more examples in which a requirement of con‐
scious awareness of the facts that make the agent’s conduct risky and
unjustifiable is unrealistic. Indeed, even in cases of intentional risk crea‐
tion, the specific risk perceived or desired is often indeterminate. When
someone strikes out at another in anger, he commits a conscious and
intentional act, but his perception of the risks of harm he is thereby
imposing is often opaque and even indeterminate. The mental states of
even some premeditated murderers are cloudier than one might initially
suspect: the actor often is not in a constant state of awareness of the
risks he is deliberately posing, but is instead culpable for not taking
proper steps to access his prior state of awareness. Consider a simple
example. D plans to kill V. He (a) takes out his gun, (b) aims it at V, and
(c) pulls the trigger. Just prior to moment (c), D is preoccupied with
feelings of elation and excitement. If he was to honestly explain his
thoughts and feelings at that moment, he would, let us suppose, say: “I
am excited, I feel a rush, I feel immensely powerful.” But, let us further
suppose, his consciousness does not include any beliefs or feelings con‐
cerning the resulting death he is about to cause. Even if we could relia‐
bly ascertain these facts, does D really deserve to be acquitted of inten‐
tional murder? Yet, at that instant, he has no “internal reason” to kill
(unless enjoying a feeling of power counts as a “reason,” which is quite
doubtful in this context). Is it not plausible to permit conviction here, on
the ground that, having formed an intention to kill, he has an ongoing
responsibility to ensure that he does not execute that intention?
Moreover, the authors’ consciousness requirement also runs into
difficulties when we address (1) the difficulty ordinary people face in un‐

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1601910

File: Simons Review AlexFerzSSRN

24

Created on: 5/7/2010 8:05:00 AM

The University of Chicago Law Review

Last Printed: 5/7/2010 8:05:00 AM

[77:xxx

derstanding the concept of probability and (2) the culpability of conduct
that extends over time. First, consider probability. Suppose Red believes
that running the red light under the circumstances creates a 10 percent
chance of striking a pedestrian, and believes that if she strikes a pede‐
strian, there is a 20 percent chance he will suffer serious injury. Does
she recognize that the probabilities are independent, so that the chance
of seriously injuring the pedestrian is (10 percent x 20 percent), or
2 percent? Or does she mistakenly believe that one adds the probabili‐
ties, so that the chance of seriously injuring the pedestrian is
30 percent? These different beliefs should, under the authors’ approach,
result in significantly different levels of punishment.36
Secondly, consider the issue of culpable conduct that extends over
time. Here is one of the authors’ vivid (and contrarian!) examples:
Joe, John, and Jake . . . all drink themselves into an extreme state of
intoxication in a pub. Joe is so drunk he cannot find his car and
passes out in the parking lot. John does find his car and drives it
quite dangerously, but luckily hits no one. Jake also finds his car, al‐
so drives it quite dangerously, and plows into another car, killing its
occupants.
...
Under our schema, if getting intoxicated in a public place without
surrendering one’s car keys is unjustifiably risky to others—
because one might then drive dangerously—then Joe, John, and
Jake have committed the same culpable act in getting intoxicated
and are equally culpable. They are not culpable for what they do
subsequently if after they become intoxicated they do not perceive
their conduct to be risky. John’s dangerous driving and Jake’s fatal
crash are merely fortuitous “results” of their culpable act of exces‐
sive drinking and are immaterial to their culpability (pp 191–92).
Those who believe that consequences matter to criminal liability
will of course find this set of examples a reductio ad absurdum of the
authors’ contrary position. But I share the authors’ view that outcome
luck should be irrelevant. Nevertheless, I find their analysis here prob‐
36 The authors might plausibly reply that, in the end, all that matters for criminal culpability
is what probability of harm the D believed she was creating, in light of the reasons she had for
imposing the risk. Whether erroneous or confused reasoning produces that bottom‐line probabili‐
ty is arguably irrelevant. But this reply does not entirely solve the problem, since D might not con‐
sciously come to any specific conclusion about how to combine the two probabilities. Recall that, in
the preconscious category of cases, the authors are willing to consider what the actor means when
she vaguely recognizes the dangerousness of her conduct (p 52). Should one similarly not ask what
the actor means when she vaguely recognizes that two distinct probabilities must interact in pro‐
ducing a final probability?
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lematic, though for a very different reason: it treats as completely irrele‐
vant the fact that John and Jake actually decided to drive after they be‐
came intoxicated. Although Joe initially intended to do so, as well, he
never faced the moment of choice. Should an account focused on culpa‐
ble choice not give some weight to the actual choices that actors make?
The authors take a narrow time‐slice view of choice, asking at each
moment what risks the actor consciously took. A more capacious and
plausible conception of criminal culpability would frame the issue diffe‐
rently: given that John and Jake were aware of the risk at time T1, and
given that they made a decision to drive very soon thereafter at T2, is it
not fair to ask them to exercise the control they still had (albeit an im‐
paired control due to alcohol) not to drive at T2?
The upshot? Taken literally, the “conscious awareness of risk” re‐
quirement of the recklessness criterion will almost never be satisfied. So
it is understandable that the authors want to loosen the requirement. But
in doing so, they either ask a question that often cannot be answered, or
else, they implicitly insert an evaluative reasonableness element into their
analysis: given what the actor already did specifically (or even vaguely)
believe, what specific risks should he have been worried about? And what
should he have been aware of? What should he have inferred? If such
judgments of reasonableness become part of the analysis, however, then
the authors’ supposedly bright‐line distinction between recklessness and
negligence becomes just a matter of degree.
Once again, I do acknowledge that any culpable criterion that makes
legally relevant an actor’s consciousness or belief will face difficult
questions about the requisite degree and quality of that consciousness,
and about its requisite objects. Should latent knowledge of facts suffice?
Unconscious awareness? Is it enough to believe that changing a CD
could cause some type of unspecified harm? Or must the actor advert to
the possibilities of death, and serious bodily injury, and minor bodily
injury, and property damage?37 How thoroughly must the legally rele‐
vant belief occupy the actor’s mind? Suppose Irma carries a loaded gun
in public. Is she culpable only if she is thinking about the gun and its
loaded status the entire time that she is in a public place? Is it enough
that she had such thoughts immediately before appearing in public?
Immediately after? What if the actor forgets that she is posing a risk?
Forgetting is “involuntary,” the authors say, so the failure to advert to
the forgotten facts cannot, by itself, be the basis of criminal liability (p

37 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Intention, 29 Cardozo L Rev 1147, 1185–90 (2008)
(analyzing the difficult problem of matching the actor’s intention with what the criminal law prohi‐
bits); Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of Criminal Law 449–59 (Oxford 1997)
(discussing whether intent should affect the level of culpability for a result).
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81).38 Yet one’s ability to access facts that one has momentarily forgot‐
ten seems to differ only in degree from one’s ability to access facts that
one holds in the preconscious (which, the authors claim, suffices for
criminal liability (p 58)). Moreover, even those of us who support crim‐
inal liability in some cases of negligent inadvertence acknowledge that
the duty to become aware of risks of harm is triggered by the actor’s
actual awareness of some contextual facts—of enough contextual facts
that it is seriously wrongful not to recognize the risks. If an actor is
completely unaware of any facts about her environment, she cannot
even be negligent.39

38 The authors offer an intriguing example of forgetting that not only displays the radical
subjectivism of their approach (under which results are entirely irrelevant), but also demonstrates,
once again, why we should not always demand that the actor be consciously aware of the legally
relevant facts.

Consider someone who, as he is returning from work and driving into his driveway, notices
that his brakes are soft. He realizes that it would be reckless to drive with the brakes in that
condition, so he resolves to have them fixed before driving. He also knows that he is likely to
forget this by the next morning, so he resolves to write a reminder note to himself when he
gets inside his house.
Suppose he does not do so. Then he may be reckless for deciding not to write the note, even if
the next morning he remembers to get the brakes fixed, or drives without incident. For he
consciously ran an unjustifiable risk of forgetting the brakes, then driving, and then causing
an accident.
On the other hand, if his failure to write the reminder note was due to being greeted upon en‐
tering the house with the news that his father was deathly ill, or that his daughter had been
severely injured in a soccer collision—news that completely occupies his attention and
crowds out his resolution to write himself a reminder about the brakes—then his failure to
write the note will not be reckless, again irrespective of what it leads to the next day. The cost
of averting one’s attention from, say, news of a family crisis in order to write a reminder note
about one’s car is high relative to the risks (of forgetting to write the note, then forgetting
about the brakes, then driving, and then having an accident). Forgetting is itself involuntary.
Failing to act to avert forgetting is voluntary and may be culpable depending on the reasons for
failing to act. But very often, those reasons will be good reasons and will not display insuffi‐
cient concern for others’ welfare (pp 80–81).
This analysis is problematic, however. The authors suggest that if one has a good enough rea‐
son for failing to write the note, one would not be reckless for not doing so. But under their ap‐
proach, it should not matter whether one has a good or bad reason for failing to write the note. If
the actor does not write the note because he gets a call from his partner in crime about the bank
robbery they are planning, and this causes him to forget to write the note, he is still not reckless,
under their theory. Once he gets the call, he is no longer adverting to the risks from the bad brakes.
It should not matter, on their approach, why he does not advert to the risks. By contrast, under an
approach that permits punishment for some forms of culpable indifference or unreasonable failure
to be aware of or to infer the existence of risks, the reason why an actor is not aware of a risk is
indeed legally relevant. (Their actual example is consistent with their theory only if the actor con
sciously decides not to write the note when he gets the phone call; however, that is not a very realis‐
tic scenario.)
39 The issue is actually a bit more complicated. If D1 deliberately drinks herself into an un‐
conscious stupor, knowing that she is likely to harm V while in that state, she might not be negli‐
gent at the time that she harms V (assuming that she is then entirely unconscious), but of course
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I am not suggesting that any actor who at one point in time is
aware of creating a risk of harm thereafter has an ongoing duty to re‐
main in a state of constant high alert to ensure that the risk does not
persist. Such a duty is both entirely unrealistic and frequently counter‐
productive.40 The point is simply that any culpability requirement that
depends on consciousness also must depend on capacity—capacity to
bring latent knowledge to bear, to make straightforward inferences from
the facts of which one is vividly aware, to investigate further, and so
forth. But once one lets this camel’s nose into the tent, there is no prin‐
cipled reason for concluding that no type of inadvertent negligence or
culpable indifference can be sufficiently culpable to deserve punishment.
The heart of the debate, in other words, should be: what types and de‐
gree of incapacity should preclude criminal liability? Although it is not
an easy matter to say what kinds of less than fully conscious decisions
and actions demonstrate sufficient culpability for criminal liability, that
is where the debate over the minimally necessary culpability for crimi‐
nal punishment should focus.41
The authors would, I suspect, respond as follows. A person who is
“capable” (in the sense just described) of acting otherwise but who
lacks awareness of the legally relevant facts has no “internal reason” to
act differently. Punishing him would therefore violate the maxim that
“ought” implies “can” (pp 56–57). This reply proves far too much, how‐
ever. Consider a straightforward case, not of failure to perceive a risk,
but failure to draw a reasonable inference from what one perceives. Re‐
call the self‐absorbed yuppie couple, Sam and Ruth, who placed their
small child in the bath upstairs, with the water running, then greeted
their guests. Suppose, in this variation, that while they socialized with
their guests, they did remember that the child was in the bath. But they
her prior culpable act justifies criminal liability. Compare permanently unconscious D2, who indeed
cannot be negligent because at no point in time was he capable of recognizing legally relevant risks.
40 For example, this “high alertness” strategy might be counterproductive if it causes the actor
to be less responsive to dangers than if he attended both to the risks and to how carefully he is
engaging in the risky activity. Drivers who focus only on who might be victimized by their driving
might pay too little heed to how carefully they are driving.
41 For some valuable discussions of capacity and its relationship to moral and criminal re‐
sponsibility, see George Sher, Who Knew?: Responsibility without Awareness 109–10, 113–15 (Ox‐
ford 2009) (arguing that moral and prudential demands only apply to those actors with sufficient
cognitive capacity); R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law
57–77 (Hart 2007) (arguing that in situations where an actor has an exculpatory justification for
her actions, she can be held morally responsible, but not answerable, for those actions); John Gard‐
ner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 Buff Crim L Rev 575, 580–85 (1998) (arguing that capacity should be
understood in relation to the actor’s social role); H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 155
(Oxford 1968) (rejecting the “mistaken assumption that the only way of allowing for individual
incapacities is to treat them as part of the ‘circumstances’ in which the reasonable man is supposed
to be acting”); George Sher, In Praise of Blame 57–59 (Oxford 2006) (arguing that moral blame
attaches to moral failings but not to failings caused by mental or physical defects).
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reassured each other that the child would be perfectly safe because they
would hear a splash or scream if the child was in any real trouble. Their
inference from the facts (that the child is in no danger) clearly is grossly
unreasonable and, let us assume, flows from their selfish concern with
their social standing. The authors must now claim that Sam and Ruth
have “no internal reason” to make a different, correct inference, for
they did not consciously choose to draw the mistaken inference. But that
claim in turn seems to presuppose that an actor is not culpable unless he
is consciously aware, at the relevant moment of action, not only of cer‐
tain minimal facts bearing on the risks and reasons that render his act
unjustifiable, but also of all deficiencies in his own practical reasoning
that bear on the justifiability of his act—an extraordinarily unrealistic
assumption.
IV. THE SURPRISING REAPPEARANCE OF THE REASONABLE PERSON
A final topic deserves attention. Despite their unequivocal rejection
of the “reasonable person” as part of a criterion of liability for culpable
inadvertence to risk, the authors endorse a reasonable person criterion
elsewhere in their theory, and indeed make it central to the recklessness
determination. For they insist that the factfinder must make the judg‐
ment of whether the actor, in improperly weighing the reasons for his
act against the risks it creates, grossly deviated from the standard that a
law‐abiding person (pp 43, 87)42 or a “reasonable person” (pp 91, 286)
would observe.43 Moreover, they apply this gross deviation approach
both to excuses such as duress, and to justifications and prima facie
liability (pp 43, 91, 135).44 The authors are remarkably casual and un‐
specific in identifying the content and contours of this “reasonable per‐
son” criterion, which they occasionally (and without distinction) de‐
scribe instead as a “law‐abiding person” criterion or even the criterion

42 The source of the reference to the “law‐abiding” person is the Model Penal Code, which
uses this phrase in its definition of recklessness instead of the “reasonable” person language it
employs in its definition of negligence. See MPC § 2.02(2)(c)–(d). But it is doubtful that the different
formulations were meant to have different meanings. See Simons, 1 Ohio St J Crim L at 186 (cited
in note 15) (pointing out that the Model Penal Code commentary gives no explanation of the differ‐
ence between the terms).
43 The authors argue for a gross deviation rather than a simple deviation from the standard of
the law‐abiding or reasonable person: “The criminal law should not be concerned with those actors
who, although they impose risks that are not justified by their reasons, are only minimally culpable
(because their reasons almost justify the risks they perceive)” (p 43).
44 The authors emphasize that their “gross deviation” requirement is both a crucial principle
of lenity and an important constraint on the discretion of state officials (pp 314–15).
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of the “ordinary person” (p 314).45 Ordinary or customary behavior is
of course quite distinguishable from reasonable behavior.
The authors’ endorsement of a reasonable person criterion here is
surprising and in tension with their rejection of any form of criminal
liability for unreasonable inadvertence.46 If a reasonable person test is
an incoherent or arbitrary construct, as they claim in the latter context,
how can it be an intelligible guide in other contexts? To be sure, invoking
a reasonable person criterion to limit criminal liability (in the form of a
requirement that the conscious decision to create an unjustified risk be
grossly unjustifiable or grossly inexcusable, relative to a reasonable per‐
son standard) might be less disquieting than invoking it to extend crimi‐
nal liability to where an actor should, as a reasonable person, have been
aware of a risk but was not, or should have made sound inferences from
the facts of which he was aware. If one is generally troubled by “reason‐
able person” criteria, it is especially problematic to employ them as cri‐
teria of inculpation. Nevertheless, the authors never explain why their
general objection to reasonable person criteria has no force in this con‐
text.
What is the source of the authors’ apparently inconsistent attitude
towards reasonable person criteria? The fact‐law distinction appears to
be the answer. The authors oppose a criterion that asks what facts a
reasonable person would be aware of (recall Red and Green, and Sam
and Ruth).47 But they endorse a criterion that asks whether as a matter
of law, consciously taking a particular risk for a particular set of reasons
is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do (pp 152–
53). Put differently, their highly subjective approach to culpability in‐
sists that the actor have a subjective understanding of the relevant facts
but not of the governing legal norms.
To illustrate, imagine yet another variation of the story of yuppie
couple Sam and Ruth. Suppose they do remember that their child is in the
bath as they are socializing with their guests, but they honestly, subjec‐
tively believe (1) there is only a 1 in 1,000 chance that the child will
drown, and (2) that chance is worth taking because the benefits of unin‐
terrupted socializing outweigh that risk. The second subjective belief is
irrelevant, under both current criminal law and the authors’ approach

45 In one instance, the authors frame the question as whether “what the actor did is a ‘gross
deviation’ from what the ordinary citizen, with ordinary concern for the interests of others, would
do” (p 314). In their proposed jury instruction, they use all three terms interchangeably: the jury
must find that the actor “grossly deviated from what an ordinary, reasonable, law‐abiding actor
would do” (p 329).
46 It is also in tension with their argument that, in defining “objective risk,” there is no non‐
arbitrary way to specify an “objective” risk of harm. See notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
47 See notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
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(pp 152–53). It is irrelevant because their mistaken belief concerns a
matter of law, not fact—assuming, as is very likely, that the factfinder
would consider it unjustifiable to take such a risk (or assuming that the
criminal code itself predefines the objective value of the relevant risks and
reasons in such a way that their conduct is unjustifiable) (p 280). Even
subjectivist retributivists such as the authors are properly reluctant to
require all actors to be subjectively aware of the immorality or illegality of
their conduct.48 Such a requirement would permit terrorists and others
with belief systems radically at odds with the community’s social and
legal norms to obtain a full defense to criminal liability.
But are the authors really entitled to rely on the fact‐law distinction
in this way? After all, if, as they believe, culpability requires a conscious
choice not to conform to social and legal norms, and not simply a gross‐
ly unreasonable failure to so conform, it seems plausible to insist that
the actor must be conscious of the legal as well as factual features of his
conduct that make that conduct unjustifiable. Should we therefore not
require the actor to recognize that he is violating the governing legal
norms? The authors concede that they have not offered a full justifica‐
tion of the distinction.49 What they should also concede is that asking
whether a reasonable person would be aware of the relevant facts is also
sometimes an appropriate element of determining criminal liability. For
here, too, we are employing an objective standard to measure the culpa‐
bility of the actor. If Sam and Ruth are culpable despite their sincerely
held but socially objectionable values (as in the last variation), why are
they not culpable in the original example, when their socially unaccept‐
able values explain why they did not remember the risk to their child?
Ignorance or mistake of fact, like ignorance or mistake of law, can have
its source in the actor’s objectionable values. In either case, the actor
displays “insufficient concern” (in the authors’ sense) for the interests
of others (pp 151–54).
A further problem with the authors’ use of the reasonable person
criterion is this: they invoke the criterion to limit criminal liability to
grossly unjustifiable or grossly inexcusable acts, and thus they conflate
two quite distinct categories, justification and excuse. To be sure, they
are not alone in suppressing the difference by employing an opaque
reasonable person standard. The Model Penal Code sometimes does em‐

48 “A choice that reflects insufficient concern for others’ interests is the paradigmatic culpable
choice. The fact that the actor believes her lack of concern is justifiable cannot make it so” (p 153).
49 “Here we can do no more than merely assert our belief, one that most of our practices of
blaming and punishing presuppose, that one is morally culpable for ‘mistakes’ of justificatory
strength but not for mistaken beliefs about factual matters” (p 153 n 76).
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ploy reasonableness language in its excuse provisions.50 But this undiffe‐
rentiated approach is unwise. When otherwise criminal acts are justi‐
fied, those acts instantiate ideal, or at least permissible, behavior. When
otherwise criminal acts are merely excused, those acts instantiate un‐
derstandable human failures of will, cognition, and the like. The language
of “reasonableness” fits far more comfortably with this conception of
justification than with excuse. The reasonable person criterion is best
interpreted as a standard by which one should guide one’s behavior. But
the better characterization of a person who harms an innocent under
the threat of duress, or who kills the victim in response to an unders‐
tandable provocation, is that he acts without (or with diminished) cul‐
pability, not that he acts in an ideal or even permissible manner. Accor‐
dingly, it would be much more desirable to banish “reasonableness” cri‐
teria from legal doctrines of excuse in order to assure that this distinc‐
tion is preserved.51
Consider specifically the authors’ treatment of duress. They provide
plausible arguments for expanding the duress defense to cover, not only
unlawful threats of force, but also lawful threats, nonhuman threats, and
threats of harm less severe than serious bodily injury (pp 141–43).52 But
the omnibus criterion that they would adopt is a version of the (proble‐
matic) Model Penal Code test: an actor should be excused “in any situation
in which a ‘person of reasonable firmness’ would impose the risk that the
actor believed he was imposing” (p 135).53
This standard obscures more than it clarifies. In their actual analy‐
sis of the normative basis of duress, the authors provide an extremely
illuminating framework: some conventional cases of duress count as
justified in an agent‐neutral sense, some as personally justified in an
agent‐relative sense, and some as excused (pp 135–41). But the opaque
“person of reasonable firmness would impose the risk” standard muddles
these distinctions. The term “reasonable” suggests justification in at least
50 Thus, the excuse of duress turns on whether a “person of reasonable firmness” would have
been able to resist the threat, and the partial excuse of voluntary manslaughter on whether the
actor had a “reasonable explanation or excuse” for killing. See MPC §§ 2.09(1) (duress), 210.3(1)(b)
(manslaughter).
51 Possible substitute language for excuses includes: what can “fairly” be expected of an actor;
or whether it is “understandable” that the actor did not conform to the law. Indeed, the following
emphasized language in the authors’ proposed jury instruction is much more apt than the “reason‐
able person” portion of the instruction:

You need not conclude that what defendant did was the “right thing to do,” but rather, that tak
ing into account a realistic sense of faults and failings of the ordinary human being, we could not
have expected a reasonable person, one who shows proper regard for the interests of others, to
have acted otherwise than defendant acted (p 329) (emphasis added).
52 Moreover, they would also expand the duress defense to innocent threats, shields, and
bystanders (p 144).
53 See note 50.
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one of the authors’ two senses. But the focus on the actor’s “firmness”
connotes the volitional dimension of excuse: one who is sufficiently
“firm” in response to the force or pressure of a sudden threat, yet still
submits to that threat, is one who cannot fairly be blamed for violating
the criminal law. His conduct is excused, not justified. As the authors con‐
cede, “When duress excuses because the actor’s ‘will is overborne,’ the
argument is that the actor was volitionally impaired, not that the actor
was personally justified” (p 140). The elegant simplicity of their reasona‐
ble person formulation of excuse is, alas, inadequate to express the rele‐
vant distinctions that their own analysis elucidates.54
CONCLUSION
You are conversing with a lively interlocutor. She offers a brilliant
but outlandish argument against conventional wisdom. “That can’t be
right,” you think. You pause. “Or can it?”
Your initial reaction was correct. But you suffer from a nagging un‐
ease: the standard view she is criticizing is surprisingly difficult to explain
and justify. And you know there is much to be learned from your interlo‐
cutor.
This scintillating (and sometimes exasperating) book is unlikely to
overturn conventional wisdom about the desirable scope and content of
the criminal law. But it will certainly provoke and incite criminal law
scholars in the most worthy of enterprises—making sense of positions
that they take for granted, rebutting arguments that they too easily dis‐
miss, and identifying a coherent and attractive conception of retributiv‐
ism. The authors hope to be accomplices to the destruction of the crimi‐
nal law as we know it. I hate to be the bearer of bad news; they will fail.
Nevertheless, their rigorous romp through the retributivist landscape is
a bracing reminder that there is much we do not yet understand about
this familiar terrain.

54 I do agree with the authors that insofar as their formulation addresses excuse rather than
justification, it may properly be formulated as an open‐ended standard rather than a rule (p 146).
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